It Can't Be Humane
OPINION
The National Law Journal
September 11, 2006
ast June, the Supreme Court in Hill v. McDonough (2006) reaffirmed
its decision in Nelson v. Campbell (2004), approving the use of
42 U.S.C. 1983 to attack a means of execution as violative of the
Eighth Amendment. In so doing, it permitted condemned inmates nearing
the end of their legal appeals to sidestep a ban on virtually all
successive habeas corpus petitions filed by applicants who cannot
establish innocence. These challenges, impugning specific lethal
injection procedures rather than the method in general, were deemed
by the justices not to run afoul of the rule that assaults on the
lawfulness of confinement must proceed by way of habeas. Hill fueled
as well as ratified onslaughts on what many consider a benign mode
of accomplishing death. Recent lower-court cases, however, have
revealed potentially torturous aspects of execution by lethal injection.
If they become widely known, these uncomfortable facts may exacerbate
ambivalence about capital punishment, since no publicly acceptable
execution technique appears to operate in a reliably 'sanitized'
manner.
Over the years, the hangman and the firing squad gave way to
the electric chair and the gas chamber. In 1977, Oklahoma adopted
lethal injection; Texas first employed it in 1982. Now used (solely
or as an alternative means) in 37 out of 38 death-penalty states,
it has effectively superseded its predecessors. Each succeeding
instrumentality ironically was touted initially as a 'kinder, gentler'
way of killing, only to be exposed later for the grisly form of
torture it was. Unfortunately, the real-life setting in which inmates
are put to death does not come close to guaranteeing a painless
demise, as advertised.
The predominant protocol calls for use of a three-drug 'cocktail':
sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide or Pavulon, and potassium
chloride. Administered sequentially, the first, a barbiturate,
is meant to render the prisoner unconscious; the second is a paralytic
agent; the third induces cardiac arrest. Even when nothing goes
wrong with the procedure, the condition of the inmate's veins,
often severely compromised by drug abuse, may subject him to prolonged
stabbing as executioners try to locate an entry port for the intravenous
lines. Worse yet, prison officials have sometimes sought to utilize
a 'cut-down' process. This method, at issue in Nelson, would have
involved making a two-inch surgical incision beneath the bad vessels--employing
only local anesthetic.
Currently, however, court challenges to lethal injection mainly
invoke the risk that the execution itself will go awry: specifically,
that the condemned person will regain consciousness during the
second or third stages. If so, all agree, he will experience a
sense of suffocation and excruciating pain. Further, because of
the paralyzing Pavulon, he will be unable to communicate his distress.
Several courts have found the likelihood of such an eventuality
sufficient to stay executions and call for changes in the protocol.
(A 2005 article in the Lancet reported post-mortem concentrations
of thiopental in the blood consistent with awareness in 21 of the
49 executed inmates studied.) In June, in Taylor v. Crawford, the
8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals put all Missouri executions on
hold; a similar California case, Morales v. Hickman, awaits a hearing
in September.
No appropriate safeguards
Taylor encapsulates the problems that arise when states adopt
medical procedures without appropriate medical (or executive) safeguards.
The district court found that Missouri employed no written execution
protocol. Relatedly, there were no checks on official discretion,
with the result that such protocol as did exist was inconsistently
applied. Most shocking, the physician in charge, who was solely
responsible for drug dosage, had been sued for malpractice more
than 20 times; had had his admitting privileges suspended at two
hospitals; and, as he admits, suffers from dyslexia--'which causes
him confusion with regard to numbers'! Because the American Medical
Association and the American Society of Anesthesiologists ethically
oppose participation in executions, reputable doctors refuse to
assist, thus relegating the process mainly to unqualified personnel.
Theoretically, states could adopt instruments of death like the
guillotine or, more likely, barbiturates alone, which could obviate
most of these risks. But concern for witnesses' sensibilities (beheading
conjures up al-Queda; death by barbiturate overdose would be lengthy
and might cause involuntary jerking) has privileged 'pretty' over
painless executions. The only good solution lies in ceasing entirely
to 'tinker with the machinery of death' ( Callins v. Collins (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) by abolishing capital punishment itself.
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